Safe and secure. In other words, safe and protected. Both terms seem very similar, but in implementation there are (significant) differences and even contradictions. How exactly does this work and how do you bridge the contradictions?
Let us first examine the terms safe and secure. With both safety and security, you prevent damage or injury. However, safety protects against unintentionally caused or spontaneously occurring damage, while security protects against human actions intended to cause damage or injury. In the latter case, there is an attacker who devises a plan to cause damage and who, if necessary, tries to circumvent the security measures. This threat usually comes from outside, while safety primarily relates to internal risks. In general, we can also state that safety primarily focuses on protecting people, while in security, attention to material matters predominates.
The same measures for safety and security
To achieve the desired safety and security level, you implement (technical and organizational) measures. Sometimes these are the same measures. For example, access control to the room with hazardous substances prevents unauthorized persons from entering the room. From a safety perspective, you thereby prevent persons without appropriate training from (unintentionally) causing accidents with the hazardous substances. From a security perspective, you prevent persons with malicious intent from entering and using the hazardous substances to (intentionally) cause damage. Another example concerns evacuation measures. These are quickly associated with fire or accidents involving hazardous substances (safety risks), but regularly prove their worth in security incidents as well, such as aggression or a bomb threat. Camera systems, finally, can detect unauthorized persons with malicious intent (security), but can also verify a fire alarm (safety).
When safety and security work against each other
When organizations implement both safety and security measures, they must ensure that these do not counteract each other. To minimize the risk of a terrorist attack with a shooter, organizations implement security measures that prevent a shooter from entering the building. The safety measures that are implemented are intended to safely evacuate the building if the shooter does manage to reach their target. These types of measures can also counteract each other. For example, the access control measures implemented at entrances to non-public areas. These must prevent unauthorized persons from accessing this department. In an emergency situation, those doors must immediately open to allow emergency response team members access. Emergency exits are another example. These are primarily known as a safety measure and intended to allow people to escape during a calamity. These doors open automatically when necessary. From a security perspective, however, open emergency exits are a risk. They allow unwanted visitors access or serve as the exit for criminals who want to escape with their loot.
Laws and regulations
In the field of safety – and particularly with escape routes – we deal with extensive laws and regulations. Logical, because it concerns human lives. Emergency exits must be easy to open according to these rules. And the escape route and the escape itself may not be hindered by access control provisions. The performance requirements for this are stated in the Building Decree and in NEN-EN 1125. But what if this safety regulation brings a major security risk? Fortunately, there are still some other possibilities, including a limited time delay on emergency exits. This is permitted according to NEN-EN 13637 for buildings with a high risk profile and only under certain conditions.
Example: Museums and emergency exits
“A good example of this are museums, where goods of great value are stored or displayed. For many museums, emergency exits are a serious risk. Art thieves can make grateful use of them,” explains Erik Poulussen, specialist in securing museums. “In these types of situations, we sometimes apply time delay to emergency exits. This limited time delay is only permitted if security personnel – after the emergency release of an emergency exit is pressed – have the opportunity to directly assess the situation on site. For example, with live camera footage that allows them to see what is happening. Is it misuse or is there really an incident? After reviewing these images, they can decide to immediately open the door or extend the delay. The latter is only allowed for a specific and limited time. We naturally only implement time delay after very careful consideration and after we have gone through all realistic scenarios. You must be certain that the doors will open when they really need to. You must also ensure that the doors open if systems or the security personnel themselves fail (fail-safe). Incidentally, it is mandatory to involve the Safety Region and obtain their approval for any solution that deviates from the Building Decree. So also in these types of situations. Technically speaking, good possibilities already exist to clearly inform people standing at the emergency door. For example, via a display showing that the emergency release has been correctly activated, but that a delay is active. A countdown timer can also display the remaining delay time.”
Conclusion
In practice, it comes down to the fact that when developing safety and security measures, you must not only comply with applicable laws and regulations. You must also properly assess the impact of security measures on the safety level, and vice versa. If you are able to properly align both disciplines, the safety and security measures will not counteract each other, but complement each other.
More information?
Mactwin has extensive experience with these types of situations. We are familiar with the (im)possibilities and regulations. We also speak the language of the involved authorities. Please feel free to contact us!