Safe and secure.
In other words, safe and secure.
Both terms are very similar, but in the implementation there are (big) differences and even contradictions.
How exactly does that work and how do you bridge the contradictions?
To start, let’s take a closer look at the terms safe and secure.
With both safety and security, you prevent damage or injury.
However, safety protects against unintentionally caused or spontaneous damage, while security protects against human actions that aim to cause damage or injury.
In the latter case, there is an attacker who comes up with a plan to cause damage and tries to circumvent the security measures if necessary.
This threat usually comes from outside, while safety mainly relates to internal risks.
In general, we can also say that safety mainly focuses on the protection of people, while in security the attention on material things predominates.
The same measures for safety and security
In order to achieve the desired level of safety and security, you must take (technical and organisational) measures. Sometimes these are the same measures. In this way, access control to the area with hazardous substances prevents unauthorised persons from entering the room. From a safety point of view, this prevents people without appropriate training from (unintentionally) causing accidents with the hazardous substances. From a security point of view, you prevent people with malicious intentions from entering and using the hazardous substances to (intentionally) cause damage. Another example concerns evacuation measures. These are quickly associated with fire or accidents caused by hazardous substances (safety risks), but also regularly prove their worth in the event of security incidents, such as aggression or a bomb threat. Finally, camera systems can signal unauthorized persons who have malicious intentions (security), but can also verify a fire alarm (safety).
Sometimes safety and security work against each other
If organizations take both safety and security measures, they must ensure that they do not work against each other.
To minimize the risk of a terrorist attack with a shooter, organizations take security measures that prevent a shooter from entering the premises.
The safety measures that are taken are intended to safely evacuate the building if the shooter does manage to achieve his goal.
These types of measures can also work against each other.
For example, the access control measures that have been taken at the entrances to non-public areas.
These are intended to prevent unauthorised persons from entering this department.
In the event of an emergency, these doors must be opened immediately to allow emergency response officers to enter.
Emergency exit doors are another example.
These are mainly known as a safety measure and are intended to allow people to flee in the event of an emergency.
These doors open automatically when needed.
However, from a security point of view, open escape doors are a risk.
They allow unwanted visitors or are the exit for criminals who want to make off with their loot.
Laws and regulations
In the field of safety – and especially in the case of escape routes – we have to deal with a lot of laws and regulations. Logical, because human lives are at stake. Emergency exit doors must be easy to open according to these rules. And the escape route and the flight itself must not be obstructed by access control devices. The performance requirements for this are set out in the Building Decree and in NEN-EN 1125. But what if this safety regulation entails a major security risk? Fortunately, there are some other options, including a limited time delay on the escape doors. According to NEN-EN 13637, this is permitted for buildings with a high risk profile and only under certain conditions.
Example: Museums and emergency exit doors
“A good example of this is museums, where high-value goods are stored or exhibited. For many museums, escape doors are a serious risk. Art thieves can make grateful use of it,” says Erik Poulussen, specialist in securing museums. “In these kinds of situations, we sometimes apply time delay to the escape doors. Incidentally, this limited time delay is only permitted if security personnel have the opportunity to immediately assess the situation on site after the emergency release of an emergency exit door is pressed. For example, with live camera images that allow them to see what is going on. Is it abuse or is it really an incident? After assessing these images, they can decide to open the door immediately or extend the delay. The latter is only allowed for a certain and limited time. Of course, we only use time delay after very careful consideration and after we have gone through all realistic scenarios. After all, you have to be sure that the doors will open when you really have to. You also have to ensure that the doors open if systems or the security staff themselves fail (fail-safe). Incidentally, it is mandatory to involve the Safety Region and to obtain their approval for any solution that deviates from the Building Decree. So also in these kinds of situations. From a technical point of view, there are already good possibilities to clearly inform people who are at the emergency door. For example, via a display that shows that the emergency release has been activated correctly, but that a delay is active. Also, a countdown timer can display the remaining delay time.”
Conclusion
In practice, this means that when devising safety and security measures, you not only have to comply with the applicable laws and regulations. You also need to properly assess the impact of security measures on the level of security, and vice versa. If you are able to coordinate both disciplines, the safety and security measures will not work against each other, but complement each other.
More information?
Mactwin has a lot of experience with these kinds of situations. We are familiar with the (im)possibilities and regulations. We also speak the language of the authorities involved. Feel free to contact us!